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The Effect of Financing Changes on Discretionary Accruals Estimation 
 
Abstract:  
This study discusses the impact of financing changes (banks, shareholders loans, equity increases and other 
equity instruments) on accruals models, and discretionary accruals estimates. It pursues a threefold objective. 
Firstly, to show analytically how the occurrence of such changes affects discretionary accruals estimation. 
Secondly, to analyse empirically whether different accruals models - Jones (1991), Dechow and Dichev (2002), and 
McNichols (2002) - reflect in a similar way the impact of changes in corporate financing. Thirdly, compare for the 
Portuguese context the efficiency of the proposed methodology to Shan, Taylor and Walter (2013), in order to 
assess the relative performance of each one. Empirical evidence shows that the measurement error induced by not 
well-specified accruals models is affected by the sign of financing changes, being different for positive and 
negative changes; all models reflect in a similar way the impact of changes in corporate financing; and for the 
Portuguese context, the matched-firm approach on financing changes, intended to mitigate the problem caused by 
such changes on discretionary accruals, does not work well.  
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1. Introduction 
The literature on earnings management studies is vast (e.g., Ronen & Yaari, 2008). In most cases, they use 
discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings manipulation, estimated with a model where accruals are the 
dependent variable and the firm’s change in revenues (e.g., Jones, 1991) or cash flows (e.g., Dechow & Dichev, 
2002) are the main independent variables. 
One of the criticisms most often addressed to such models is that they omit explanatory variables correlated 
with the accruals (Ball & Shivakumar, 2008; Liu, 2008; Moreira, 2006; Shan et al., 2013). This omission may 
induce measurement error in estimating discretionary accruals, leading to situations where a firm is classified as 
manipulative when, in fact, it may not have manipulated earnings (e.g., Ball & Shivakumar, 2008; Chen, Hribar & 
Melessa, 2018; Dechow, Hutton, Kim & Sloan, 2012; Liu, 2008; Shan et al., 2013). An obvious consequence of 
such a situation is the discredit of studies that use discretionary accruals as a driving component of their analyses.  
In many studies, authors have attempted to find solutions to solve the problem caused by omission of 
explanatory variables in accruals models (e.g., Dechow et al., 2012; Shan et al., 2013). However, the solutions they 
propose are not always applicable to all cases. This happens, for example, with the solution proposed by Dechow et 
al. (2012), according to which we need to know exactly the periods accruals are managed and reversed. Gerakos 
(2012) recognize that such approach is only applicable when one uses a sample of firms with known manipulation. 
Other solutions, as the matched-firm approach presented by Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005), only mitigates the 
misspecifications for samples where the omitted variable presents extremes values, but can exaggerate 
misspecification in other situations (Dechow et al., 2012).  
The current study discusses the impact of corporate financing changes, hereafter financing changes (bank 
and shareholders loans, equity increases and other equity instruments), on accruals models, and discretionary 
accruals estimates. It proposes a way to tackle with the omission of the debt change variable in accruals models, in 
order to control the measurement error induced by such omission. Somehow, the current paper follows a research 
line similar to that of  Shan et al. (2013), but it tests a different economic and entrepreneurial context, and uses a 
diverse methodology. Based on Dechow et al. (2010) findings, that the measurement error in estimating 
discretionary accruals tends to be related to industry characteristics and the contexts where firms operate, we expect 
the solution proposed by Shan et al. (2013) not to work in the Portuguese economic and entrepreneurial context 
underlying our research. We then will replicate Shan et al. (2013) methodology to test whether it is applicable in 
such a context.  
Our study adds to recent studies that seek to propose new approaches to estimate discretionary accruals 
(e.g., Gerakos, 2012; Kim, Kim, Kwon & Lee, 2015; Marai & Pavlović, 2014). Thus, our main motivation is to 
make a contribution to improve existing accruals models.  
The empirical methodology adopted is similar to that used by Moreira (2006), based on a comparative 
static approach. Two versions of each model are estimated, differentiating by the consideration in one of them of a 
variable controlling for financing changes. The differential measurement error allows conclusions about the quality 
of the model specification and its consequences for accruals estimation. In a first moment a graphic analysis is 
carried out; afterwards, and to test the robustness of the results, an analysis based on simulations is performed (e.g., 
Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney, 1995; Hribar & Collins, 2002; Kothari et al., 2005; Shan et al., 2013).  
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The present study makes three main contributions to the literature. Firstly, it shows that the measurement 
error induced by models poor specification is affected by the sign of financing changes. Secondly, the measurement 
error exists regardless of the size and sign of those changes. Finally, the results of the study add to the scarce 
literature on the estimation of accruals in a context of non listed small and medium firms, and shows that a 
matched-firm approach on financing changes likewise Shan et al. (2013) does not work in such a context.  
The study contains five additional sections. The second section discusses analytically the accruals impact 
arisen from financing changes. The following section introduces the methodology to be used and some descriptive 
statistics. The empirical results are presented and discussed in section four.  Finally, the main conclusions, 
contributions and limitations of the study are discussed.  
 
2. Financing Changes and Accruals Measurement Error 
Accruals definition and its correlation with financing changes  
Let us begin by introducing a balance sheet definition of total accruals (ACC) (e.g., Dechow et al., 1995; Healy, 
1985; Jones, 1991; McNichols, 2002): 
ACC = ∆CA − ∆CL − ∆CASH + ∆CMD − DA                                                                                       [1] 
where the symbol ∆ stands for change, CA is current assets; CL is current liabilities; CASH is cash; CMD is 
current maturities of long-term debt; and DA is the depreciation and amortization expense.  
There are authors (e.g., Peasnell, Pope & Young, 2000; Young, 1999) that argue that the depreciation and 
amortization expense, due to its visibility and predictability, is essentially non-discretionary and therefore have 
limited potential as an instrument of earnings management. Hence, they suggest that accruals estimation should use 
working capital accruals (WCA) instead of ACC, which are obtained by adding DA to the above equation (1).  
Rearranging the variables, changes in current assets net of changes in cash is defined as ∆NCA = ∆CA - 
∆CASH, and changes in current liabilities net of changes in current maturities of long-term debt as ∆NCL = ∆CL - 
∆CMD. It is then possible to write: 
WCA = ∆NCA − ∆NCL                                                                                                                             [2] 
The relationship between WCA and changes in corporate financing is developed based on the balance sheet 
identity (e.g., Dechow, Richardson & G.Sloan, 2008; Richardson, Sloan, Soliman & Tuna, 2005; Shan et al., 2013):  
   =    +     !"#                                       [3] 
TA can be decomposed into net current asset (NCA) plus other assets (OA). In turn, TL can be decomposed 
into net current liabilities (NCL), financing (FIN) and other liabilities (OL). Finally, TOE, also a source of 
corporate financing, can be decomposed into equity and other equity instruments (EOEI), and other equity (OE). 
Thus, expression (3) can be rewritten as follows: 
NCA + OA = NCL + FIN + OL + EOEI + OE                                                                                              [4] 
Isolating NCA and NCL on the left side of the expression and merging all sources of financing into one 
variable, which is designed as total financing FINT = FIN + EOEI is possible to obtain the following expression:  
NCA − NCL = FINT + OL + OE − OA                                                                                                         [5] 
Applying changes to this expression one gets:  
WCA = ∆FINT + ∆OL + ∆OE − ∆OA                                                                                                        [6] 
It is now obvious that ∆FINT is a determinant of WCA.
1
  
In general, the accruals models include a set of independent variables (V1, V2,…, Vn) that explain the 
dependent variable, ACC or WCA. For the purpose of the current discussion, let us assume it is WCA. It can then 
be written as WCA = f(V1, V2,…, Vn), and an accruals model in the following way (e.g., Moreira, 2006):  
WCA) = ∑ β,-,,/01 . V/                                                                                                                                   [7] 
where 45 is a set of estimated parameters; Vj are explanatory variables, specific of each model, but assumed 
to be related to WCA.
2
 Most common accruals models do not contain one or more explanatory variables that 
control for financing changes (bank and shareholders loans, equity increases and other equity instruments). 
However, as Ball and Shivakumar (2008) suggest, when a firm increases its financing it tends to use the 
proceedings to increase inventories and accounts receivable as a result of an expansion of its operations. In such 
cases, increases in inventories and in receivables imply positive changes in WCA beyond those directly related to 
                                                          
1
 Recent studies show that there is a positive and statistically significant correlation between WCA and ∆FINT. For example, 
in Shan et al. (2013) the correlation between WCA and ∆FINT is 0.22 and 0.17 for Spearman and Pearson coefficients 
correlation, respectively; in Zhang (2007) it is 0.211 and 0.322. 
2
 For example, in the Jones (1991) Model (JM) they correspond, essentially, to the change in revenues; in Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) Model (DDM) they correspond to cash flows from operations in periods t-1, t and t+1. 
4 
 
the change in revenues. The opposite situation will tend to occur when a firm undertakes a negative financing 
change, reducing its financing level (e.g., Zhang, 2007). Hence, a positive financing change (∆PF) is expected to 
lead to an increase in WCA and a negative one (∆NF) to a decrease. Defining WCA6666666 as total accruals in a “steady 
state”, characterized by no changes, then if during the analysis period a given firm faces situations of ∆PF or ∆NF, 
it is possible to write the following inequality: 
WCA∆78 < WCA6666666 < WCA∆:8                                                                                                                       [8] 
where WCA∆NF (WCA∆PF) is total accruals when in the period there are only negative (positive) financing changes.  
This relationship shows the impact of these changes on WCA according to their nature (positive/negative). 
However, as mentioned above, because most commonly used accruals models (e.g., Ball & Shivakumar, 2006; 
Dechow & Dichev, 2002; Jones, 1991; Peasnell et al., 2000) do not incorporate any explanatory variable directly 
related to such changes then accruals estimates may contain a measurement error.  
The evidence suggests thus that accruals models are not well-specified, and thus should be improved (e.g. 
Shan et al., 2013; Young, 1999).  
Measurement error in estimating discretionary accruals   
Taking model (7) and assuming only one explanatory variable (e.g. change in revenue, V) and an independent term 
;< it comes: WCA) =  α< + β1V) + δ)                                                                                                                           [7.1]  
where ? is the residual term of the equation. Taking into account the above discussion on the asymmetric impact of 
financing changes on the equation, one has to conclude that the model is not well-specified and suffers from an 
omitted uncorrelated explanatory variables bias (e.g., Johnston, 1984). It misses one or more explanatory variables 
that explain the impact of financing changes on the dependent variable (WCAt). The econometric consequences of 
such a problem are well-known: the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables will not be biased (in this 
case 4@1), but the independent term will absorb the mean effect of the omitted variables and the error term will 
absorb the remaining (Johnston, 1984).  
For a better understanding of these consequences, let’s assume ∝B<∆:8 is the independent term when there are 
only ∆PF in the estimation period; ∝B<∆78 when there are only ∆NF; and ∝B<∆:8/∆78, the “average” independent 
coefficient, when there are simultaneously ∆PF and ∆NF. The “average” coefficient will be lower than ∝B<∆:8 and 
higher than ∝B<∆78, and one may write the following relationship:  
∝B<∆78<∝B<∆:8/∆78 < ∝B<∆:8                                                                                                                                [9] 
Thus, in the most common situation, when there are both types of financing changes during the period,
3
  
the independent term tends to be an “average” coefficient that does not fit either ∆PF or ∆NF situations. 
The measurement error is now easy to predict if one takes into account the “average” coefficient and the 
residual of the equation ( ?), the so called discretionary accruals (DAC). Based on equation (7.1), the residual can 
be written as: 
WCA) − DαB< + βE1V)F = δ) = DAC)                                                                                                          [10] 
where the expression in parentheses equals the estimated “normal” value of WCA DWCAG )F. 
Let’s define the measurement error (ERR) as the difference between DAC estimates obtained with a model 
that controls (C) for the financing changes (DACC), and DAC estimates of a model like equation (10) that does not 
control (NC) for such changes (DACNC). The error can thus be written as ERR = DACC - DACNC. Taking into 
account the effects discussed above and expression (9), it is possible to establish the following prediction for the 
measurement errors:  
HERR∆:8 < 0ERR∆78 > 0                                                                                                                                              [11] 
Thus, if accruals estimation is not controlled for financing changes then one may expect that DAC 
estimations are overestimated for firm-years having ∆PF, and underestimated for those having ∆NF. 
                                                          
3
 If we think that the model is regressed cross-sectionally for a single year but there are firms facing ∆PF and others facing 




3. Research Design and Sample Selection 
Methodology  
As mentioned above, one purpose of the current study is to test the existence of DAC measurement errors caused 
by the lack of control for financing changes. We test the Jones (1991) model (JM), Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model (DDM) and McNichols (2002) model (MM). 
The methodology is identical to the one used by Moreira (2006), based on a comparative static approach 
that compares accruals estimates obtained with two versions of the models: the current version, that does not 
control (NC) the effect of financing changes and a version that controls (C) for such changes. The models are 
defined as follows: 
NC:   WCA) =∝<+ ∑ β,-,,/01 . V/ + ξ)                                                                                                          [12] 
C:   WCA) =∝<+ ∑  β,-,,/01 . V/ + γ1. C) + μ)                                                                                              [13] 
where WCA is working capital accruals; Vj is a set of independent variables underlying the basic model
4
; Ct is a 
dummy variable that intends to control for the effect of ∆FINTt (assumes value 1 if the financing change is positive, 
0 if negative
5
); ∝, 4, P are parameters; and Q and R are the residuals of the regressions.  
The tow full versions of each used model are the following: 
JMH ST  ⟹ VTW = ;< + 41XSYW  + 4Z∆[ YW + QWT ⟹ VTW = ;< + 41XSYW  + 4Z∆[ YW + \1TW + RW] …………………               ………………[14] 
DDMH ST  ⟹ VTW = ;< + 41T^W_1  + 4ZT^W + 4`T^Wa1 + QWT ⟹ VTW = ;< + 41T^W_1  + 4ZT^W + 4`T^Wa1 + \1TW+RW] ……                              ..[15] 
MM H ST  ⟹ VTW = ;< + 41T^W_1  + 4ZT^W + 4`T^Wa1 + 4b∆[ YW + QWT ⟹ VTW = ;< + 41T^W_1  + 4ZT^W + 4`T^Wa1 + 4b∆[ YW + \1TW + RW]…                        ….[16] 
where, 
WCAt - Working capital accruals in yeart defined as changes in current assets less changes in current 
liabilities less changes in cash plus changes in current maturities of long-term debt; 
INVt – Is the inverse of average total assets of yeart; 
∆REVt – Change in revenue in yeart; 
CFOt - Cash flows from operations in yeart, 
CFOt-1, CFOt+1 - Are the previous and next period’s cash flow from operations, respectively;  
∆FINTt - Total financing changes in yeart,  that includes changes in short-term and long-term bank 
financing, in shareholders loans, in equity and in others instruments of equity; 
Ct - Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if ∆FINTt >0, 0 otherwise; 
Qt, Rt - Estimation errors which complies the classical assumptions of the models estimated by Ordinary 
Least Squares. 
After accruals models estimation for each version, we compute the ERR, as mentioned before, according to 
the difference between DACC and DACNC for each observation. To show the impact on DAC of the missing control 
for ∆FINTt, we performed a graphical and simulation analysis that, for ease of exposition, will be explained in 
detail in the results section. 
In order to test for Shan et al. (2013) proposals, we also use the methodologies detailed in their paper, 
namely the matched-firm approach based on Kothari et al. (2005). 
Sample dataset and descriptive statistics
6
  
The basic sample is composed of all private Portuguese firms included in the Iberian Balance Sheet Analysis 
System (SABI) with data for the period 1998-2007. This period, in its upper limit year, is constrained by the 
economic crisis that affected the Portuguese Economy after 2008. Take more recent years would risk to mix in the 
analysis unwanted effects.  
Given their accruals and business specificities, financial and public firms are eliminated from the initial 
sample. Observations with missing data, and outliers for WCAt (1%+1%) by year and industry, are also eliminated. 
                                                          
4
 Change in revenues in JM; cash flows from operations of the years t-1, t e t+1 in the DDM; these same cash flows and the 
change in revenues in MM. 
5
 Observations with null ∆FINTt were eliminated.   
6
All statistical analysis is performed using the Statistical Analysis System (SAS) software.  
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For the purpose of regressing accruals models cross-sectionally, industries with less than 30
7
 yearly observations, 
and observations with null financing changes are eliminated. After all eliminations, the final sample has 48,041 
observations. 
The following table displays the descriptive statistics of the main variables. As shown in expression (6) and 
discussed above, ∆FINTt seems to be a determinant of WCAt, and both variables tend to have similar distribution as 
suggested by the values displayed in Table 1-Panel A.  
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
 Mean STD Q1 Median Q3 
Panel A: Variables of the models 
   
WCAt 0.060 0.176 -0.029 0.042 0.136 
INVt 
 
0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
∆REVt 0.095 0.532 -0.078 0.046 0.216 
CFOt-1 0.061 0.167 -0.013 0.062 0.138 
CFOt 0.065 0.163 -0.016 0.065 0.147 
CFOt+1 0.070 0.256 -0.010 0.069 0.153 
∆FINTt 0.043 0.186 -0.035 0.017 0.106 
Panel B: DAC estimates not controlling for ∆FINTt   
JM 0.000 0.148 -0.071 -0.002 0.069 
DDM 0.000 0.061 -0.032 -0.002 0.031 
MM 0.000 0.058 -0.030 -0.001 0.030 
Panel C: DAC estimates controlling for ∆FINTt     
JM 0.000 0.142 -0.068 -0.001 0.066 
DDM 0.000 0.060 -0.032 -0.002 0.031 
MM 0.000 0.058 -0.030 -0.001 0.030 
Notes: 
Variables definition: WCAt - Working capital accruals in yeart defined as changes in current assets less changes in 
current liabilities less changes in cash plus changes in current maturities of long-term debt (See expression (1) ); INVt – is the 
inverse of average total assets of yeart; ∆REVt – Change in revenue in yeart; CFOt - cash flows from operations in yeart , CFOt-
1, CFOt+1 - are the previous and next periods cash flow from operations, respectively; ∆FINTt –Total financing changes in 
yeart,  that includes changes in short-term and long-term bank financing, in shareholders loans, in equity and in others 
instruments of equity (e.g., Shan et al., 2013; Zhang, 2007); DAC – discretionary accruals; JM, DDM and MM as defined 
above. All variables are deflated by average total assets. The number of observations is 48,041. 
By definition of a linear regression, the mean of controlled and not controlled DAC is equal to zero in all 
models. The values of the remaining distribution moments displayed are very similar for controlled and not 
controlled estimations, the major differences arising for JM. This model also shows descriptive statistics twice as 
high as other models.  
Table 2 displays correlation coefficients. An emphasis is given to the (expected) positive and statistically 
significant correlation between WCAt and ∆FINTt, and the negative one between ∆FINTt and CFOt.  
Table 2  
Correlation coefficients Pearson/Spearman 
  WCAt INVt ∆REVt CFOt CFOt-1 CFOt+1 ∆FINTt Ct 
WCAt 1 0.084 0.265 -0.278 0.006** 0.002** 0.263 0.229 
INVt 0.093 1 0.210 0.041 0.019 0.051 0.039 0.025 
∆REVt  0.316 0.128 1 0.106 -0.054 0.069 0.052 0.031 
CFOt -0.271 0.025 0.124 1 -0.038 -0.005** -0.287 -0.258 
                                                          
7
 Other studies eliminated industries with less than 10 observations by year (e.g., Kothari et. al., 2005; Shan et al., 2013). The 
choice of a larger number (30) in the current study intended to permit a better and more precise estimation of discretionary 
accruals.   
7 
 
CFOt-1 -0.002** 0.025 -0.066 0.024 1 0.045 0.002** -0.003** 
CFOt+1 0.039 0.036 0.081 0.028 0.133 1 0.005** 0.005** 
∆FINTt 0.292 0.055 0.041 -0.353 -0.001** 0.020 1 0.623 
Ct 0.249 0.038 0.029 -0.310 -0.002** 0.014 0.851 1 
Notes:  
Variables definition as per Table 1. ** Stands for correlation not statistically significant at less than 10. All other correlations 
are statistically significant at less than 1%. The upper diagonal shows Pearson correlation coefficients; the lower Spearman’s.  
 
Moreover, it deserves to be highlighted the small correlation between ∆FINTt and ∆REVt, the only explanatory 
variable in JM, meaning that ∆REVt tends to be independent of  ∆FINTt, meaning that the former is unable to 
reflect on WCAt the impact of financing changes. The correlation between ∆FINTt and CFOt is somehow higher 
than the one discussed, and this evidence suggests that the DDM and MM models may fit a little better than JM in 
reflecting the impact of financing changes on accruals estimation.  However, in general, the correlations displayed 
suggest that the accruals models tend not to control for the impact of such changes.  
 
4. Results 
Let us remind the two empirical objectives of the current study: to analyse empirically whether different accruals 
models [Jones, (1991); Dechow and Dichev, (2002); and McNichols, (2002)] reflect the impact of changes in 
corporate financing in a similar way; to test Shan et al. (2013) proposal in the specific economic and 
entrepreneurial context of the current study.  
Accruals models and control for financing changes 
The three accruals models are regressed in two different versions that differentiate by the control for the sign of 
∆FINTt, included in the second version (Ct, a dummy variable that takes value 1 if ∆FINTt>0, 0 otherwise). Table 3 
presents the accruals models estimation for each version.  
Table 3 
Estimated versions of accruals models not controlling (NC)/ controlling (C) for changes in financing 
  Models JM DDM MM 
 Exp. 
Sign 
NC C NC C NC C 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
    (P-value) (P-value) (P-value) (P-value) (P-value) (P-value) 
Intercept ?  0.048 0.002  0.080 0.041 0.072 0.038 
  (0.000) (0.108) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INVt ? 6.287 5.391     
  (0.000) (0.000)     
∆REVt + 0.086  0.084   0.099  0.096 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Ct +  0.079  0.060   0.054 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
CFOt-1 ?   -0.004 -0.002  0.012  0.014 
    (0.332) (0.647) (0.005) (0.001) 
CFOt -    -0.299 -0.252  -0.333 -0.290 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CFOt+1 ?   0.001 0.000  -0.014  -0.014 
    (0.805) (0.941) (0.000) (0.000) 
R
2
   7.12% 11.99% 7.72% 10.38% 16.56% 18.68% 
R
2  
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Ct  - dummy variable that takes the value 1 if ∆FINTt >0, 0 otherwise. The remaining variables defined as per Table 1. JM and 
MM do not include fixed assets as an independent variable because the dependent variable WCAt does not include the 
depreciation and amortization component. The number of observations is 48,041. The models were regressed cross-sectionally 
by year and industry and the presented coefficients are averages.  
 
All coefficients have the expected sign and are statistically significant. It is worthy to note that the Ct 
coefficient is significantly positive in all models. This means that ∆FINTt has a positive impact in explaining WCA. 
For all models the incremental explanatory power of Ct is quite substantial, and the adjusted R
2
 increases. For 
example, in the case of JM, from 7.12% (version NC) up to 11.98% (version C).  
The impact on DAC estimates caused by the inclusion of Ct variable in accruals models is discussed next.  
Graphical analysis 
In section 2 it was anticipated that missing control for ∆FINTt implies that DAC are overestimated for firm-
years that recorded ∆PF (positive financing changes) and underestimated for those recording ∆NF (negative 
financing changes). In order to test these predictions graphical analyses are performed. 
For each model, DAC measurement error (ERR) is plotted against the size of the correspondent ∆FINTt, 
and a dashed line is added to show the ERR average trend. The graphs are easy to read. For example, for JM a 




Difference between DACC and DACNC estimates (ERR) by size 
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 DAC estimates are the residuals of the models regressed cross-sectionally by year and industry. 48,041 firm-years have been 





The graphical evidence corroborates the above discussed expectations. DAC do contain a measurement 
error due to model missing control for ∆FINT. Such an error (ERR = DACC - DACNC) is consistently negative for 
firm-years reporting ∆PF, meaning that in such cases DAC are overestimated; consistently positive for firm-years 
reporting ∆NF, meaning DAC are underestimated. All models tend to reflect in a similar way the control for the 
impact of financing changes. The dashed (trend) lines help to assess the similarity across models, and show that the 
means of measurement errors are almost similar for small and extreme financing changes. In this aspect, the 
empirical evidence in the current paper extends, and somehow contradicts, Shan et al. (2013) results, that suggest 
measurement errors occur mainly for extreme financing changes. In sum, the evidence shows that all models tend 
to have similar specification problems related to financing changes. 
Simulation analysis 
Now a simulation analysis is performed (e.g.,  Dechow et al., 1995; Hribar & Collins, 2002; Kothari et al., 
2005; Shan et al., 2013). It is a complementary way of testing the quality of accruals models specification, testing 
whether ERR is statistically different from zero for a given ∆FINT. The aim is to test the robustness of the 
graphical results discussed above, by computing the probability to commit a Type I error when ERR = 0, i.e. to 
incorrectly reject the true null hypothesis, H0.  
10 
 
The first step begins by taking the basic sample of 48,041 observations and create 250 random samples 
with 1,000 observations. Each sample is extracted from the complete sample. This first set of 250 random samples 
is taken as the simulation set with 0% of contamination, i.e. a set where ERR, the core variable, is assumed to be 
zero. Based on this set of random samples, the rejection frequencies or Type I error rates are estimated, using a 
two
9
 tailed t-test, for confidence levels of 1% and 5%.
10
  
The second step adopts the same procedure described previously with a little difference: the random 
samples are contaminated with a given percentage of observations that must belong to a particular subset of the 
basic sample. As observed in the graphical analysis, for all models the trend line shows that the mean of estimation 
errors are almost similar for small and extreme financing changes. Thus, in order to test whether the results show a 
similar behaviour to that depicted in the graphical analysis, contamination is done using, firstly, observations with 
extreme positive and negative ∆FINT; secondly, observations with ∆FINT close to zero.
11
 The contamination 
process starts with an “infection” rate of 10%, that consists in creating 250 intermediate random samples, without 
replacement
12
, of 100 (1,000*10%) observations that belong to the subset of extreme (close to zero) observations; 
and 250 intermediate random samples, without replacement, of 900 (1,000*(100%-10%)) observations extracted 
from the whole basic sample. Merging both intermediate samples the output is a set of 250 random samples of 
1,000 observations, with a 10% contamination level. The probability of committing Type I errors, and consequently 
the rejection percentages, can now be estimated as described above.  
The results are displayed in Table 4. In Panel A it can be seen that for a contamination level of 0% two of 
the DAC models (JM and DDM) seem not well-specified, because they have rejection rates (2.0%)
13
 above the 
level of confidence established (1%). In Panel B, and for the same level of contamination (0%), the rejection 
percentages increase slightly (8.8% up to 10.4%), and are now, for all models, above the defined level of 
confidence (5%). Thus, the rejection percentage of H0 is, generically in any of the accruals models, higher than the 
level of confidence adopted. 
When the contamination degree increases up to 10% the percentages of rejection increase very significantly 
for all models, reaching in the case of MM 95.2% for the simulation sample infected with extreme negative 
financing changes (∆FINTt<0/<Q1). For DDM and JM the percentages of rejection are similar and higher than the 
adopted confidence level. For degrees of contamination up to 20%, for both 1% or 5% levels of confidence,  the 
percentages of rejection goes up to 100%, whatever the nature (“close to zero” or “extreme”) of the measurement 
errors.  
The results are in line with the graphical analysis discussed above. As observed in the graphical analysis, 
the ERR seems to be almost similar, in all models. The percentages of rejection ERR=0 are also almost similar for 
small and extreme positive or negative financing changes. Thus, using this methodology the empirical evidence 
also suggests that the models under analysis are not well-specified when do not control for financing changes. 
There is a measurement error that is statistically different from zero. The percentages of rejection of H0 are, for all 
models and degrees of contamination, higher than the confidence levels adopted (1% or 5%).  
 
                                                          
9
 Because the hypothesis (H1) is considered in the alternative way, i.e. that ERR≠ 0.  
10
 The average ERR of each of the 250 samples is tested against the null hypothesis (H0), out of 250 tests (t-test) performed, 
which assumes that the per sample average ERR = 0. The rejection frequencies are the number of times H0 is rejected, divided 
by 250.   
11
 The definition of the subsets of extreme and close to zero observations is as follows. Negative (positive) ∆FINT were split 
into quartiles. “Extreme observations” are those below the first quartile (above the third quartile); “close to zero” observations 
are those that lie above the third quartile (below the first quartile). 
12
 Without replacement means that an observation appears once in each random sample with 1,000 observations.  
13
 The percentage (2.0%) corresponds to the relative number of times, out of 250 tests (t-test) performed, the H0 hypothesis is 




Percentages of rejection by degree of contamination 
% of contamination 0% 10% 20% 30% 
   ∆FINTt <0 ∆FINTt >0 ∆FINTt <0 ∆FINTt >0 ∆FINTt <0 ∆FINTt >0 
   <Q1 >Q3 <Q1 >Q3 <Q1 >Q3 <Q1 >Q3 <Q1 >Q3 <Q1 >Q3 
Panel A: 1% confidence level            
JM 2.0% 50.0% 80.0% 44.8% 51.2% 100.0% 100.0% 99.2% 99.2% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
DDM  2.0% 80.4% 84.4% 60.4% 43.6% 100.0% 100.0% 99.6% 97.2% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
MM 0.4% 78.8% 84.0% 82.8% 33.2% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 98.4% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Panel B: 5% confidence level           
JM 8.8% 75.2% 92.0% 70.0% 76.0% 100.0% 100.0% 99.6% 99.6% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
DDM  10.4% 93.6% 96.4% 86.0% 70.4% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 98.8% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
MM 9.6% 95.2% 94.8% 94.4% 61.6% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Notes: 
This table displays the percentages of rejection by degree of contamination. The percentages of rejection correspond to the relative number of times, out of 250 tests (t-test) 
performed, the H0 hypothesis is rejected, i.e., the number of times the ERR average by random sample is statistically different from zero. The mentioned quartiles are defined 
independently for negative (positive) ∆FINT. For levels of contamination exceeding 40% the percentage of rejection is always 100%. The confidence level is used to establish 




Testing Shan et al. (2013) methodology 
As proposed in the Introduction, Shan et al. (2013) methodology was taken and tested in 
the Portuguese context. Once again, the purpose of the experiment was to show the existence of 
measurement errors in discretionary accruals due to the lack of control for the financial changes. 
The additional empirical evidence shows results quite similar to those obtained in accordance 
with our methodology, corroborating that DAC contains a measurement error or bias when no 
control for financing changes is undertaken.  
According to Shan et al. (2013),  using the matched-firm approach on financial changes, 
based on Kothari et al. (2005), the measurement errors in discretionary accruals are eradicated. 
However, this not occurs in the Portuguese context. The results seem to be driven by the 
economic and entrepreneurial context of the analysis
14
. In summary, the evidence shows that the 
measurement error in discretionary accruals estimates, caused by ∆FINT, is not completely 
controlled by the discussed methodologies. The economic and entrepreneurial context seems to 
play an active role in their inability to accomplish such a control. 
 
5. Summary 
The aim of the present study was to analyse the specification of accruals models under 
financing changes. It pursues to show analytically how the occurrence of such changes affects 
discretionary accruals estimation, to analyse whether different accruals models reflect in a 
similar way the impact of financing changes and compare for the Portuguese context the 
efficiency of the proposed methodology to Shan et al. (2013), in order to assess the relative 
performance of each one. Three models have been tested empirically: JM, DDM and MM.  
Using a methodology based on a comparative static approach, with graphical and 
simulation analyses, the results supported the expectations: when there are financing changes 
the accruals models are not well-specified, suffering from an omitted variables bias. Moreover, 
the analyses showed that the measurement error in accruals estimates depends on the sign of 
these changes, and occurs regardless of financing changes size. 
Beyond our own methodology, we tested also a solution available in the literature, Shan 
et al.(2013), but like ours it is not completely effective in the context underlying the current 
study.   
The current study makes three main contributions. Firstly, it adds to the available 
literature and shows that there is a measurement error in accruals estimates arising from accruals 
models that do not control for financing changes, and their positive/negative sign. Secondly, it 
also shows that the estimation errors occur regardless of the size and sign of financing changes. 
Thirdly, it brings news insights on the estimation of accruals in a context of non listed small and 
medium firms.  
The current study must be seen as just another step towards a better understanding of 
accruals models and their limitations. Future research can improve it by extending the analysis 
to other accruals models, and propose different and complementary research methodologies to 
cope with the misspecification of accruals models.   
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